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Differentially Private Kalman Filtering
Jerome Le Ny and George J. Pappas
Abstract— This paper studies the H2 (Kalman) filtering
problem in the situation where a signal estimate must be
constructed based on inputs from individual participants,
whose data must remain private. This problem arises in
emerging applications such as smart grids or intelligent
transportation systems, where users continuously send data
to third-party aggregators performing global monitoring or
control tasks, and require guarantees that this data cannot
be used to infer additional personal information. To pro-
vide strong formal privacy guarantees against adversaries
with arbitrary side information, we rely on the notion
of differential privacy introduced relatively recently in the
database literature. This notion is extended to dynamic
systems with many participants contributing independent
input signals, and mechanisms are then proposed to solve
the H2 filtering problem with a differential privacy con-
straint. A method for mitigating the impact of the privacy-
inducing mechanism on the estimation performance is
described, which relies on controlling the H∞ norm of
the filter. Finally, we discuss an application to a privacy-
preserving traffic monitoring system.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many applications, such as smart grids, population
health monitoring, or traffic monitoring, the efficiency of
the system relies on the participation of the users to pro-
vide reliable data in real-time, e.g., power consumption,
sickness symptoms, or GPS coordinates. However, for
privacy or security reasons, the participants benefiting
from these services generally do not want to release
more information than strictly necessary. Unfortunately,
examples of unintended loss of privacy already abound.
Indeed, it is possible to infer from the trace of a
smart meter the type of appliances present in a house
as well as the occupants’ daily activities [1], to re-
identify an anonymous GPS trace by correlating it with
publicly available information such as location of work
[2], or to infer individual transactions on commercial
websites from temporal changes in public recommenda-
tion systems [3]. Providing rigorous guarantees to the
users about the privacy risks incurred is thus crucial
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to encourage participation and ultimately realize the
benefits promised by these systems.
In our recent work [4], we introduced privacy con-
cerns in the the context of systems theory, by relying
on the notion of differential privacy [5], a particularly
successful definition of privacy used in the database liter-
ature. This notion is motivated by the fact that any useful
information provided by a dataset about a group of peo-
ple can compromise the privacy of specific individuals
due to the existence of side information. Differentially
private mechanisms randomize their responses to dataset
analysis requests and guarantee that whether or not an
individual chooses to contribute her data only marginally
changes the distribution over the published outputs. As a
result, even an adversary cross-correlating these outputs
with other sources of information cannot infer much
more about specific individuals after publication than
before [6].
Most work related to privacy is concerned with the
analysis of static databases, whereas cyber-physical sys-
tems clearly emphasize the need for mechanisms work-
ing with dynamic, time-varying data streams. Recently,
information-theoretic approaches have been proposed to
guarantee some level of privacy when releasing time
series [7], [8]. However, the resulting privacy guarantees
only hold if the statistics of the participants’ data streams
obey the assumptions made (typically stationarity, de-
pendence and distributional assumptions), and require
the explicit statistical modeling of all available side
information. This task is impossible in general as new,
as-yet-unknown side information can become available
after releasing the results. In contrast, differential privacy
is a worst-case notion that holds independently of any
probabilistic assumption on the dataset, and controls the
information leakage against adversaries with arbitrary
side information [6]. Once such a privacy guarantee
is enforced, one can still leverage potential additional
statistical information about the dataset to improve the
quality of the outputs.
In this paper, we pursue our work on differential
privacy for dynamical systems [4], by considering the
H2 filtering problem (or steady-state Kalman filtering)
with a differential privacy constraint. In this problem,
the goal is to minimize an estimation error variance for
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a desired linear combination of the participants’ state
trajectories, based on their contributed measurements,
while guaranteeing the privacy of the individual signals.
In contrast to the generic filtering mechanisms presented
in [4], we emphasize here how a model of the par-
ticipants’ dynamics can be leveraged to publish more
accurate results, without compromising the differential
privacy guarantee if this model is not accurate. Section
II provides some technical background on differential
privacy and Section III describes a basic mechanism
enforcing privacy for dynamical systems by injecting
additional white noise. As shown in [4], accurate pri-
vate results can be published for filters with small
incremental gains with respect to the individual input
channels. This leads us in Section IV to present a
modification of the standard Kalman filter, essentially
controlling itsH∞ norm simultaneously with the steady-
state estimation error, in order to minimize the impact
of the privacy-inducing mechanism. Finally, Section V
describes an application to a simplified traffic monitoring
system relying on location traces from the participants to
provide an average velocity estimate on a road segment.
Most proofs are omitted from this extended abstract and
will appear in the full version of the paper.
II. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section we review the notion of differential
privacy [5] as well as a basic mechanism that can be used
to achieve it when the released data belongs to a finite-
dimensional vector space. We refer the reader to the
surveys by Dwork, e.g., [9], for additional background
on differential privacy.
A. Definition
Let us fix some probability space (Ω,F ,P). Let D
be a space of datasets of interest (e.g., a space of data
tables, or a signal space). A mechanism is just a map
M : D× Ω→ R, for some measurable output space R,
such that for any element d ∈ D, M(d, ·) is a random
variable, typically writen simply M(d). A mechanism
can be viewed as a probabilistic algorithm to answer a
query q, which is a map q : D→ R. In some cases, we
index the mechanism by the query q of interest, writing
Mq .
Example 2.1: Let D = Rn, with each real-valued
entry of d ∈ D corresponding to some sensitive infor-
mation for an individual contributing her data. A data
analyst would like to know the average of the entries of
d, i.e., her query is
q : D→ R, q(d) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
di.
As detailed in Section II-B, a typical mechanism Mq
to answer this query in a differentially private way
computes q(d) and blurs the result by adding a random
variable Y : Ω→ R
Mq : D× Ω→ R, Mq(d) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
di + Y.
Note that in the absence of perturbation Y , an adversary
who knows n and dj , j ≥ 2, can recover the remaining
entry d1 exactly if he learns q(d). This can deter
people from contributing their data, even though broader
participation improves the accuracy of the analysis and
thus can be beneficial to the population as a whole.
Next, we introduce the definition of differential pri-
vacy. We call a measure µ on R δ-bounded if it is a
finite positive measure with µ(R) ≤ δ. Intuitively in
the following definition, D is a space of datasets of
interest, and we have a binary relation Adj on D, called
adjacency, such that Adj(d, d′) if and only if d and d′
differ by the data of a single participant.
Definition 1: Let D be a space equipped with a binary
relation denoted Adj, and let (R,M) be a measurable
space. Let , δ ≥ 0. A mechanism M : D × Ω → R
is (, δ)-differentially private if there exists a δ-bounded
measure µ on (R,M) such that for all d, d′ ∈ D such
that Adj(d, d′) and for all S ∈M, we have
P(M(d) ∈ S) ≤ eP(M(d′) ∈ S) + µ(S). (1)
If δ = 0, the mechanism is said to be -differentially
private.
This definition is essentially the same as the one
introduced in [5] and subsequent work, except for the
fact that µ(S) in (1) is usually replaced by the constant
δ. The definition says that for two adjacent datasets, the
distributions over the outputs of the mechanism should
be close. The choice of the parameters , δ is set by
the privacy policy. Typically  is taken to be a small
constant, e.g.,  ≈ 0.1 or perhaps even ln 2 or ln 3.
The parameter δ should be kept small as it controls the
probability of certain significant losses of privacy, e.g.,
when a zero probability event for input d′ becomes an
event with positive probability for input d in (1).
Remark 1: The definition of differential privacy de-
pends on the choice of σ-algebra M in Definition 1.
When we need to state this σ-algebra explicitly, we
write M : D × Ω → (R,M). In particular, this σ-
algebra should be sufficiently “rich”, since (1) is trivially
satisfied by any mechanism if M = {∅,R}.
A useful property of the notion of differential privacy
is that no additional privacy loss can occur by simply
manipulating an output that is differentially private. This
result is similar in spirit to the data processing inequality
from information theory [10].
Theorem 1 (resilience to post-processing): Let M1 :
D × Ω → (R1,M1) be an (, δ)-differentially private
mechanism. Let M2 : D × Ω → (R2,M2) be another
mechanism such that for all S ∈ M2, there exists a
nonnegative measurable function fS such that for all
d ∈ D, we have
P(M2(d) ∈ S|M1(d)) = fS(M1(d)),∀d ∈ D. (2)
Then M2 is (, δ)-differentially private.
Remark 1: Suppose that M1 takes its values in a
discrete set. Then the condition (2) says that the con-
ditional distribution P(M2(d) ∈ S|M1(d) = m1) for
a given element m1 does not further depend of d. In
other words, a mechanism M2 accessing the dataset
only indirectly via the output of M1 cannot weaken the
privacy guarantee. Hence post-processing can be used to
improve the accuracy of an output, without weakening
the privacy guarantee.
B. A Basic Differentially Private Mechanism
A mechanism that throws away all the information
in a dataset is obviously private, but not useful, and in
general one has to trade off privacy for utility when
answering specific queries. We recall below a basic
mechanism that can be used to answer queries in a
differentially private way. We are only concerned in this
section with queries that return numerical answers, i.e.,
here a query is a map q : D → R, where the output
space R equals Rk for some k > 0, is equipped with
a norm denoted ‖ · ‖R, and the σ-algebra M on R is
taken to be the standard Borel σ-algebra, denoted Rk.
The following quantity plays an important role in the
design of differentially private mechanisms [5].
Definition 2: Let D be a space equipped with an
adjacency relation Adj. The sensitivity of a query q :
D→ R is defined as
∆Rq := max
d,d′:Adj(d,d′)
‖q(d)− q(d′)‖R.
In particular, for R = Rk equipped with the p-norm
‖x‖p =
(∑k
i=1 |xi|p
)1/p
, for p ∈ [1,∞], we denote the
`p sensitivity by ∆pq.
A differentially private mechanism proposed in [11],
modifies an answer to a numerical query by adding
iid zero-mean noise distributed according to a Gaussian
distribution. Recall the definition of the Q-function
Q(x) := 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x
e−
u2
2 du.
The following theorem tightens the analysis from [11].
Theorem 2: Let q : D → Rk be a query. Then the
Gaussian mechanism MQ : D × Ω → Rk defined by
Mq(d) = q(d) + w, with w ∼ N
(
0, σ2Ik
)
, where
σ ≥ ∆2q2 (K +
√
K2 + 2) and K = Q−1(δ), is (, δ)-
differentially private.
For the rest of the paper, we define
κ(δ, ) =
1
2
(K +
√
K2 + 2),
so that the standard deviation σ in Theorem 2 can
be written σ(δ, ) = κ(, δ)∆2q. It can be shown
that κ(δ, ) behaves roughly as O(ln(1/δ))1/2/. For
example, to guarantee (, δ)-differential privacy with
 = ln(2) and δ = 0.05, we obtain that the standard
deviation of the Gaussian noise introduced should be
about 2.65 times the `2-sensitivity of q.
III. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE DYNAMIC SYSTEMS
In this section we review the notion of differential
privacy for dynamic systems, following [4]. We start
with some notations and technical prerequisites. All
signals are discrete-time signals and all systems are
assumed to be causal. For each time T , let PT be the
truncation operator, so that for any signal x we have
(PTx)t =
{
xt, t ≤ T
0, t > T.
Hence a deterministic system G is causal if and only
if PTG = PTGPT . We denote by `mp,e the space of
sequences with values in Rm and such that x ∈ `mp,e
if and only if PTx has finite p-norm for all integers T .
The H2 norm and H∞ norm of a stable transfer function
G are defined respectively as
‖G‖2 =
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(G∗(eiω)G(eiω))dω
)1/2
,
‖G‖∞ = ess sup
ω∈[−pi,pi)
σmax(G(eiω)),
where σmax(A) denotes the maximum singular value of
a matrix A.
We consider situations in which private participants
contribute input signals driving a dynamic system and
the queries consist of output signals of this system. We
assume that the input of a system consists of n signals,
one for each participant. An input signal is denoted u =
(u1, . . . , un), with ui ∈ `miri,e for some mi ∈ N and ri ∈
[1,∞]. A simple example is that of a dynamic system
releasing at each period the average over the past l
periods of the sum of the input values of the participants,
i.e., with output 1l
∑t
k=t−l+1
∑n
i=1 ui,k at time t. For
r = (r1, . . . , rn) and m = (m1, . . . ,mn), an adjacency
relation can be defined on lmr,e = `
m1
r1,e × . . . × `mnrn,e
G1
G2
G3
+
w
w
w
u1
u2
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Fig. 1. Two architectures for differential privacy. (a) Input perturba-
tion. (b) Output perturbation.
by Adj(u, u′) if and only if u and u′ differ by exactly
one component signal, and moreover this deviation is
bounded. That is, let us fix a set of nonnegative numbers
b = (b1, . . . , bn), bi ≥ 0, and define
Adjb(u, u′) iff for some i, ‖ui − u′i‖ri ≤ bi, (3)
and uj = u′j for all j 6= i.
Note that in (3) two signals ui, u′i are considered differ-
ent if there exists some time t at which ui,t 6= u′i,t.
A. The Dynamic Gaussian Mechanism
Recall (see, e.g., [12]) that for a system F with inputs
in `mr,e and output in `
m′
s,e, its `r-to-`s incremental gain
γincr,s (F ) is defined as the smallest number γ such that
‖PTFu−PTFu′‖s ≤ γ‖PTu−PTu′‖r, ∀u, u′ ∈ `mr,e,
for all T . Now consider, for r = (r1, . . . , rn) and m =
(m1, . . . ,mn), a system G defined by
G : lmr,e → `m
′
s,e
G(u1, . . . , un) =
n∑
i=1
Giui, (4)
where Gi : `miri,e → `m
′
s,e, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Theorem 3: Let G be defined as in (4) and con-
sider the adjacency relation (3). Then the mechanism
Mu = Gu + w, where w is a white noise with wt ∼
N (0, σ2Im′) and σ ≥ κ(δ, ) max1≤i≤n{γincri,2(Gi) bi},
is (, δ)-differentially private.
Corollary 1: Let G be defined as in (4) with each
system Gi linear, and ri = 2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Then the mechanism Mu = Gu + w, where w is a
white Gaussian noise with wt ∼ N (0, σ2Im′) and σ ≥
κ(δ, ) max1≤i≤n{‖Gi‖∞ bi}, is (, δ)-differentially pri-
vate for (3).
B. Filter Approximation Set-ups for Differential Privacy
Let ri = 2 for all i and G be linear as in the Corollary
1, and assume for simplicity the same bound b21 = . . . =
b2n = E for the allowed variations in energy of each input
signal. We have then two simple mechanisms producing
a differentially private version of G, depicted on Fig. 1.
The first one directly perturbs each input signal ui by
adding to it a white Gaussian noise wi with wi,t ∼
N (0, σ2Imi) and σ2 = κ(δ, )2E . These perturbations
on each input channel are then passed through G, leading
to a mean squared error (MSE) for the output equal to
κ(δ, )2E‖G‖22 = κ(δ, )2E
∑n
i=1 ‖Gi‖22. Alternatively,
we can add a single source of noise at the output of
G according to Corollary 1, in which case the MSE
is κ(δ, )2E max1≤i≤n{‖Gi‖2∞}. Both of these schemes
should be evaluated depending on the system G and the
number n of participants, as none of the error bound is
better than the other in all circumstances. For example,
if n is small or if the bandwidths of the individual
transfer functions Gi do not overlap, the error bound for
the input perturbation scheme can be smaller. Another
advantage of this scheme is that the users can release
differentially private signals themselves without relying
on a trusted server. However, there are cryptographic
means for achieving the output perturbation scheme
without centralized trusted server as well, see, e.g., [13].
Example 3.1: Consider again the problem of releas-
ing the average over the past l periods of the sum of the
input signals, i.e., G = ∑ni=1 Gi with
(Giui)t = 1
l
t∑
k=t−l+1
ui,k,
for all i. Then ‖Gi‖22 = 1/l, whereas ‖Gi‖∞ = 1, for all
i. The MSE for the scheme with the noise at the input is
then κ(δ, )2En/l. With the noise at the output, the MSE
is κ(δ, )2E , which is better exactly when n > l, i.e., the
number of users is larger than the averaging window.
IV. KALMAN FILTERING
We now discuss the Kalman filtering problem subject
to a differential privacy constraint. With respect to the
previous section, for Kalman filtering it is assumed
that more is publicly known about the dynamics of
the processes producing the individual signals. The goal
here is to guarantee differential privacy for the individual
state trajectories. Section V describes an application of
the differentially private mechanisms presented here to
a stylized traffic monitoring problem.
A. A Differentially Private Kalman Filter
Consider a set of n linear systems, each with inde-
pendent dynamics
xi,t+1 = Aixi,t +Biwi,t, t ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (5)
where wi is a standard zero-mean Gaussian white noise
process with covariance E[wi,twi,t′ ] = δt−t′ , and the
x1
x2
xn
A
ggregator / Estim
ator
y1
y2
yn
zˆ
Fig. 2. Kalman filtering set-up.
initial condition xi,0 is a Gaussian random variable with
mean x¯i,0, independent of the noise process wi. System
i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, sends measurements
yi,t = Cixi,t +Diwi,t (6)
to a data aggregator. We assume for simplicity that the
matrices Di are full row rank, and that BiDTi = 0, i.e.,
the process and measurement noises are uncorrelated.
The data aggregator aims at releasing a signal that
asymptotically minimizes the minimum mean squared
error with respect to a linear combination of the individ-
ual states. That is, the quantity of interest to be estimated
at each period is zt =
∑n
i=1 Lixi,t, where Li are given
matrices, and we are looking for a causal estimator zˆ
constructed from the signals yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, solution of
min
zˆ
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
[‖zt − zˆt‖22] .
The data x¯i,0, Ai, Bi, Ci, Di, Li, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are as-
sumed to be public information. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
we assume that the pairs (Ai, Ci) are detectable and the
pairs (Ai, Bi) are stabilizable. In the absence of privacy
constraint, the optimal estimator is zˆt =
∑n
i=1 Lixˆi,t,
with xˆi,t provided by the steady-state Kalman filter [14].
Figure 2 shows this initial set-up.
Suppose now that the publicly released estimate zˆ
should guarantee the differential privacy of the par-
ticipants. This requires that we first specify an adja-
cency relation on the appropriate space of datasets. Let
x = [xT1 , . . . , x
T
n ]
T and y = [yT1 , . . . , y
T
n ]
T denote the
global state and measurement signals. Assume that the
mechanism is required to guarantee differential privacy
with respect to a subset Si := {i1, . . . , ik} of the
coordinates of the state trajectory xi. Let the matrix Ti
be the diagonal matrix with [Ti]jj = 1 if j ∈ Si, and
[Ti]jj = 0 otherwise. Hence Tiv sets the coordinates of
a vector v which do not belong to the set {i1, . . . , ik}
to zero. Fix a vector ρ ∈ Rn+. The adjacency relation
considered here is
AdjρS(x, x
′) iff for some i, ‖Tixi − Tix′i‖2 ≤ ρi, (7)
(I − Ti)xi = (I − Ti)x′i, and xj = x′j for all j 6= i.
In words, two adjacent global output signals differ by
the trajectory of a single participant, say i. Moreover,
for differential privacy guarantees we are constraining
the range in energy variation in the signal Tixi of
participant i to be at most ρ2i . Hence, the distribution
on the released results should be essentially the same
if a participant’s output signal value Tixi,t0 at some
single specific time t0 were replaced by Tix′i,t0 with‖Ti(xi,t0−x′i,t0)‖ ≤ ρi, but the privacy guarantee should
also hold for smaller instantaneous deviations on longer
segments of trajectory.
Depending on which signals on Fig. 2 are actually
published, and similarly to the discussion of Section III-
B, there are different points at which a privacy induc-
ing noise can be introduced. First, for the input noise
injection mechanism, the noise can be added by each
participant directly to their transmitted measurement
signal yi. Namely, since for two state trajectories xi, x′i
adjacent according to (7) we have for the corresponding
measured signals
‖yi − y′i‖2 = ‖CiTi(xi − x′i)‖2,
differential privacy can be guaranteed if participant i
adds to yi a white Gaussian noise with covariance
matrix κ(δ, )2ρ2iσ
2
max(CiTi)Ipi , where pi is the dimen-
sion of yi,t. Note that in this sensitivity computation
the measurement noise Diwi has the same realization
independently of the considered variation in xi. At the
data aggregator, this additional noise can be taken into
account in the design of the Kalman filter, since it can
simply be viewed as an additional measurement noise.
Again, an important advantage of this mechanism is
its simplicity of implementation when the participants
do not trust the data aggregator, since the transmitted
signals are already differentially private.
Next, consider the output noise injection mechanism.
Since we assume that x¯i0 is public information, the initial
condition xˆi,0 of each state estimator is fixed. Consider
now two state trajectories x, x′, adjacent according to
(7), and let zˆ, zˆ′ be the corresponding estimates pro-
duced. We have
zˆ − zˆ′ = LiKi(yi − y′i) = LiKiCiTi(xi − x′i),
where Ki is the ith Kalman filter. Hence ‖zˆ − zˆ′‖2 ≤
γiρi, where γi is the H∞ norm of the transfer function
LiKiCiTi. We thus have the following theorem.
Theorem 4: A mechanism releasing
(
∑n
i=1 LiKiyi)+γκ(δ, ) ν, where ν is a standard white
Gaussian noise independent of {wi}1≤i≤n, {xi,0}1≤i≤n,
and γ = max1≤i≤n{γiρi}, with γi the H∞ norm of
LiKiCiTi, is differentially private for the adjacency
relation (7).
B. Filter Redesign for Stable Systems
In the case of the output perturbation mechanism,
one can potentially improve the MSE of the filter with
respect to the Kalman filter considered in the previous
subsection. Namely, consider the design of n filters of
the form
xˆi,t+1 = Fixˆi,t +Giyi,t (8)
zˆi,t = Hixˆi,t +Kiyi,t, (9)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where Fi, Gi, Hi,Ki are matrices to
determine. The estimator considered is
zˆt =
n∑
i=1
zˆi,t,
so that each filter output zˆi should minimize the steady-
state error variance with zi = Lixi, and the released
signal zˆ should guarantee the differential privacy with
respect to (7). Assume first in this section that the
system matrices Ai are stable, in which case we also
restrict the filter matrices Fi to be stable. Moreover, we
only consider the design of full order filters, i.e., the
dimensions of Fi are greater or equal to those of Ai,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Finally, we remove the simplifying
assumption BiDTi = 0.
Denote the overall state for each system and associ-
ated filter by x˜i = [xTi , xˆ
T
i ]
T . The combined dynamics
from wi to the estimation error ei := zi − zˆi can then
be written
x˜i,t+1 = A˜ix˜i,t + B˜iwi,t
ei,t = C˜ix˜i,t + D˜iwi,t,
where
A˜i =
[
Ai 0
GiCi Fi
]
, B˜i =
[
Bi
GiDi
]
,
C˜i =
[
Li −KiCi −Hi
]
, D˜i = −KiDi.
The steady-state MSE for the ith estimator is then
limt→∞ E[eTi,tei,t].
In addition, we are interested in designing filters with
small H∞ norm, in order to minimize the amount of
noise introduced by the privacy-preserving mechanism,
which ultimately impacts the overall MSE. Considering
as in the previous subsection the sensitivity of filter
i’s output to a change from a state trajectory x to an
adjacent one x′ according to (7), and letting δxi =
xi − x′i = Ti(xi − x′i) = Tiδxi, we see that the change
in the output of filter i follows the dynamics
δxˆi,t+1 = Fiδxˆi,t +GiCiTiδxi
δzˆi = Hiδxˆi,t +KiCiTiδxi.
Hence the `2-sensitivity can be measured by the H∞
norm of the transfer function[
Fi GiCiTi
Hi KiCiTi
]
. (10)
Simply replacing the Kalman filter in Theorem 4, the
MSE for the output perturbation mechanism guarantee-
ing (, δ)-privacy is then
n∑
i=1
‖C˜i(zI − A˜i)−1B˜i + D˜i‖22 + κ(δ, )2 max
1≤i≤n
{γ2i ρ2i },
with γi := ‖Hi(sI − Fi)−1GiCiTi +KiCiTi‖∞.
Hence minimizing this MSE leads us to the following
optimization problem
min
µi,λ,Fi,Gi,Hi,Ki
n∑
i=1
µi + κ(δ, )
2λ (11)
s.t. ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ‖C˜i(zI − A˜i)−1B˜i + D˜i‖22 ≤ µi,
(12)
ρ2i ‖Hi(zI − Fi)−1GiCiTi +KiCiTi‖2∞ ≤ λ. (13)
Assume without loss of generality that ρi > 0 for all i,
since the privacy constraint for the signal xi vanishes if
ρi = 0. The following theorem gives a convex sufficient
condition in the form of Linear Matrix Inequalities
(LMIs) guaranteeing that a choice of filter matrices
Fi, Gi, Hi,Ki satisfies the constraints (12)-(13). These
LMIs can be obtained using the change of variable
technique described in [15].
Theorem 5: The constraints (12)-(13), for some
1 ≤ i ≤ n, are satisfied if there exists matrices
Wi, Yi, Zi, Fˆi, Gˆi, Hˆi, Kˆi such that Tr(Wi) < µi, and
the LMIs (14), (15) shown next page are satisfied.
If these conditions are satisfied, one can recover
admissible filter matrices Fi, Gi, Hi,Ki by setting
Fi = V
−1
i FˆiZˆ
−1
i U
−T
i , Gi = V
−1
i Gˆi,
Hi = HˆiZ
−1
i U
−T
i , Ki = Kˆi, (16)
where Ui, Vi are any two nonsingular matrices such that
ViU
T
i = I − YiZ−1i .
Note that the problem (11) is also linear in µi, λ.
These variables can then be minimized subject to the
LMI constraints of Theorem 5 in order to design a good
filter trading off estimation error and `2-sensitivity to
minimize the overall MSE.

Wi (Li − KˆiCi − Hˆi) (Li − KˆiCi) −KˆiDi
∗ Zi Zi 0
∗ ∗ Yi 0
∗ ∗ ∗ I
  0,

Zi Zi 0 0 0 0
∗ Yi 0 Fˆi 0 GˆiCiTi
∗ ∗ λ
ρ2i
I Hˆi 0 KˆiCiTi
∗ ∗ ∗ Zi Zi 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ Yi 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ I
  0, (14)

Zi Zi ZiAi ZiAi ZiBi
∗ Yi (YiAi + GˆiCi + Fˆi) (YiAi + GˆiCi) (YiBi + GˆiDi)
∗ ∗ Zi Zi 0
∗ ∗ ∗ Yi 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ I
  0. (15)
C. Unstable Systems
If the dynamics (5) are not stable, the linear filter
design approach presented in the previous paragraph is
not valid. To handle this case, we can further restrict the
class of filters. As before we minimize the estimation
error variance together with the sensitivity measured by
the H∞ norm of the filter. Starting from the general
linear filter dynamics (8), (9), we can consider designs
where xˆi is an estimate of xi, and set Hi = Li,Ki = 0,
so that zˆi = Lixˆi is an estimate of zi = Lixi. The error
dynamics ei := xi − xˆi then satisfies
ei,t+1 = (Ai −GiCi)xi,t − Fixˆi,t + (Bi −GiDi)wi,t.
Setting Fi = (Ai − GiCi) gives an error dynamics
independent of xi
ei,t+1 = (Ai −GiCi)ei,t + (Bi −GiDi)wi,t, (17)
and leaves the matrix Gi as the only remaining design
variable. Note however that the resulting class of filters
contains the (one-step delayed) Kalman filter. To obtain
a bounded error, there is an implicit constraint on Gi
that Ai −GiCi should be stable.
Now, following the discussion in the previous subsec-
tion, minimizing the MSE while enforcing differential
privacy leads to the following optimization problem
min
µi,λ,Gi
n∑
i=1
µi + κ(δ, )
2λ (18)
s.t. ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
‖Li(zI − (Ai −GiCi))−1(Bi −GiDi)‖22 ≤ µi, (19)
ρ2i ‖Li(zI − (Ai −GiCi))−1GiCiTi‖2∞ ≤ λ. (20)
Again, one can efficiently check a sufficient condition,
in the form of the LMIs of the following theorem,
guaranteeing that the constraints (19), (20) are satisfied.
Optimizing over the variables λi, µi, Gi can then be
done using semidefinite programming.
Theorem 6: The constraints (19)-(20), for some 1 ≤
i ≤ n, are satisfied if there exists matrices Yi, Xi, Gˆi
such that
Tr(YiLTi Li) < µi,
[
Yi I
I Xi
]
 0, (21)Xi XiAi − GˆiCi XiBi − GˆiDi∗ Xi 0
∗ ∗ I
  0, (22)
and

Xi 0 XiAi − GˆiCi GˆiCiTi
∗ λ
ρ2i
I Li 0
∗ ∗ Xi 0
∗ ∗ ∗ I
  0. (23)
If these conditions are satisfied, one can recover an
admissible filter matrice Gi by setting
Gi = X
−1
i Gˆi.
V. A TRAFFIC MONITORING EXAMPLE
Consider a simplified description of a traffic moni-
toring system, inspired by real-world implementations
and associated privacy concerns as discussed in [2], [16]
for example. There are n participating vehicles traveling
on a straight road segment. Vehicle i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
is represented by its state xi,t = [ξi,t, ξ˙i,t]T , with ξi
and ξ˙i its position and velocity respectively. This state
evolves as a second-order system with unknown random
acceleration inputs
xi,t+1 =
[
1 Ts
0 1
]
xi,t + σi1
[
T 2s /2 0
Ts 0
]
wi,t,
where Ts is the sampling period, wi,t is a standard white
Gaussian noise, and σi1 > 0. Assume for simplicity
that the noise signals wj for different vehicles are
independent. The traffic monitoring service collects GPS
measurements from the vehicles [2], thus getting noisy
readings of the positions at the sampling times
yi,t =
[
1 0
]
xi,t + σi2
[
0 1
]
wi,t,
with σi2 > 0.
The purpose of the traffic monitoring service is to
continuously provide an estimate of the traffic flow
velocity on the road segment, which is approximated
by releasing at each sampling period an estimate of the
average velocity of the participating vehicles, i.e., of the
quantity
zt =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ξ˙i,t. (24)
With a larger number of participating vehicles, the sam-
ple average (24) represents the traffic flow velocity more
accurately. However, while individuals are generally
interested in the aggregate information provided by such
a system, e.g., to estimate their commute time, they
do not wish their individual trajectories to be publicly
revealed, since these might contain sensitive information
about their driving behavior, frequently visited locations,
etc. The privacy mechanism proposed in [2] perturbs
the GPS traces by dropping 1 out of k measurements at
each given location (the sampling is event based rather
than periodic as here). This makes individual trajectory
tracking potentially harder, but no formal definition of
privacy is introduced, and hence no quantitative privacy
guarantee can be provided.
A. Numerical Example
We now discuss some differentially private estimators
introduced above, in the context of this example. All
individual systems are identical, hence we drop the
subscript i in the notation. Assume that the selection
matrix is T =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, that ρ = 100 m, Ts = 1s,
σi1 = σi2 = 1, and  = ln(3), δ = 0.05. A single
Kalman filter denoted K is designed to provide an
estimate xˆi of each state vector xi, so that in absence
of privacy constraint the final estimate would be
zˆ =
[
0 1n
] n∑
i=1
Kyi =
[
0 1
]K( 1
n
n∑
i=1
yi
)
.
Finally, assume that we have n = 200 participants, and
that their mean initial velocity is 45 km/h.
In this case, the input noise injection scheme without
modification of the Kalman filter is essentially unusable
since its steady-state Root-Mean-Square-Error (RMSE)
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Fig. 3. Two differentially private average velocity estimates, with n =
200 users. The Kalman filters are initialized with the same incorrect
initial mean velocity, in order to evaluate their convergence time.
is almost 26 km/h. However, modifying the Kalman
filter to take the privacy inducing noise into account as
additional measurement noise leads to the best RMSE
of all the schemes discussed here, of about 0.31 km/h.
Using the Kalman filter K with the output noise injection
scheme leads to an RMSE of 2.41 km/h. Moreover in
this case ‖K‖∞ = 0.57 is quite small, and trying to
balance estimation with sensitivity using the LMI of
Theorem 6 (by minimizing the MSE while constraining
the H∞ norm rather than using the objective function
(18)) only allowed us to reduce this RMSE to 2.31 km/h.
However, an issue that is not captured in these steady-
state estimation error measures is that of convergence
time of the filters. This is illustrated on Fig. 3, which
shows a trajectory of the average velocity of the par-
ticipants, together with the estimates produced by the
input noise injection scheme with compensating Kalman
filter and the output noise injection scheme following K.
Although the RMSE of the first scheme is much better,
its convergence time of more than 1 min, due to the
large measurement noise assumed, is much larger. This
can make this scheme impractical, e.g., if the system
is supposed to respond quickly to an abrupt change in
average velocity.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have discussed mechanisms for preserving the
differential privacy of individual users transmitting mea-
surements of their state trajectories to a trusted central
server releasing sanitized filtered outputs based on these
measurements. Decentralized versions of these mech-
anisms can in fact be implemented in the absence of
trusted server by means of cryptographic techniques
[17]. Further research on privacy issues associated with
emerging large-scale information processing and con-
trol systems is critical to encourage their development.
Moreover, obtaining a better understanding of the design
trade-offs between privacy or security and performance
in these systems raises interesting system theoretic ques-
tions.
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